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VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
Anyone who has reviewed the decisions of our courts for ten
years cannot fail to be impressed by the carelessness or ignorance
or both of many members of the bar and the efforts of our appellate
courts to find a way, if possible, to make the lawyer's blunders in
procedure as little costly as possible to the client. A notable example
is found in McEwan, Gearinger, Banks & Hutcheson v. Lookout
Mountain Hotel, Inc.' Counsel had made so many blunders in at-
tachment proceedings and pleas in abatement that the court charac-
terized the case as a comedy of errors and remanded it with directions
that would permit a presentation of the case on the merits. In
numerous opinions where an appeal is ineffective because of seemingly
inexcusable blunders of counsel, the court has treated the record as
that in a writ of error,2 and at times it has found the really serious
problem presented in the technical record. But in some instances the
mistakes are such as to be incurable and the court is helpless to save
the client. Thus in a workmen's compensation case with a foreign
corporation as the defendant employer, the original mistake in naming
the wrong insurance carrier was curable, but eliminating it destroyed
the court's jurisdiction over the employer, and the attempted service
of process upon the substituted carrier was such as to be totally
ineffective under the statute. The court could do nothing but dismiss
the action, even though on the merits the plaintiff had recovered
judgment.
3
In this article no mention is made of the numerous reiterations
of the rule that in considering a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial court must deny the motion where there is any material evidence
that would warrant a jury in finding against the moving party. Nor
is there noted the many, many applications of the courts' settled prac-
tice to deny a petition to rehear which merely reargues matters which
counsel insist were improperly decided after argument and full
consideration.
4
Again, it must be said that this survey is in most respects a mere
"horizontal digest." Thus far the editors have received no suggestion
for changing its character. It is hoped that those who read it will
express an opinion as to whether it should deal only with new prob-
lems presented by the current decisions.
1. 338 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. 1960).
2. See Brister v. Brubaker's Estate, 336 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960)
(failure to perfect appeal).
3. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Kirkland, 338 S.W.2d 549
(Tenn. 1960).





1. Law of Sister State.-Where in an action for damages for per-
sonal injuries suffered in a sister state the law of that state is not
pleaded, it will be presumed to be the same as that of Tennessee. The
court did not stress this point and noted that the law of the sister
state appeared in a cited case to be the same as that of Tennessee.
It made no reference to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 24-610,
-613 regarding proof or judicial notice of foreign law.5
2. Written Undertaking-Verbatim.-When an answer sets out
verbatim a written agreement signed by defendant, the defendant on
demurrer cannot question the fact or content of the writing, nor can
he claim a lack of knowledge of it or assert a denial of its execution
by him.
6
3. Setting for Argument.-In interpreting Tennessee Code Anno-
tated section 20-912, the court has held that it is discretionary with
the trial judge to dismiss the action if the plaintiff fails to set the
demurrer for argument. This was done by the judge in a workmen's
compensation case, and the supreme court found no abuse of discre-
tion, for the technical record showed no irregularity, and plaintiff
had filed no bill of exceptions.
7
B. Answer-Special Defenses
In an action involving the custody of a child, the complaint alleg-
ing in effect assault and battery of P by D, D's answer was a denial.
D sought to introduce evidence (1) that P had assaulted D in the
controversy in which the alleged battery occurred and (2) that in a
contempt proceeding in which D was charged with disobeying an
order concerning the custody of the child, the chancellor had dis-
charged D. The court held that neither of these defenses was subject
to proof under the answer. Each was the proper subject of a special
defense.8
C. Plea in Abatement-Jurisdiction of Subject Matter
After pleading lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, defendant
withdrew the plea and answered on the merits. The effect of thus
proceeding was a waiver of the plea to the jurisdiction, but since the
question concerned a matter of which the parties could not by consent
5. March v. Fowler, 340 S.W.2d 881 (Tenn. 1960).
6. Moss v. Fortune, 340 S.W.2d 902 (Tern. 1960).
7. Edingbourgh v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 337 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. 1960).
8. Roberts v. Hickson, 343 S.W.2d 108 (Tenn. App. 1960).
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confer jurisdiction upon the court, the opinion shows a full con-
sideration of the defendant's contention and its lack of merit.9
But a motion to be permitted to withdraw an answer and to demur
on the ground that the court of chancery had no jurisdiction may be
properly denied unless challenged, as provided in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 16-616, by a plea in abatement, demurrer, or motion
to dismiss. It is too late to make such a challenge, as a matter of
right, after interposing an answer on the merits. And a denial of a
motion to be permitted to plead a late demurrer is reversible only
for abuse of discretion. In this connection it is to be remembered that
the chancellor is empowered to treat an issue as if he were a circuit
judge in the absence of a timely challenge to jurisdiction. 0
D. Amendment-Demurrer
P's original bill alleged (1) the terms of an agreement which gave
plaintiff an option to sue for breach or to retain the amount deposited
by the purchaser, and (2) an offer by P to credit the amount de-
posited upon any award of damages for D's refusal to buy. On de-
fendant's demurrer to the bill, P asked leave to amend by striking the
allegation of the offer and inserting (1) a statement of deposit of the
sum with a real estate broker and (2) an averment that the allegation
of the option was mistaken. The court held that the allegation of the
option was clear and limited plaintiff's choice of action, that the
amendment was plainly inconsistent with the terms of the option and
the allegations of the original bill. The demurrer was properly sus-
tained and the motion to amend was properly denied."
E. Counterclaim-Against State
In an action in which the state seeks an injunction against the
misuse of an abandoned entrance to a limited access highway by an
abutting owner, it does not thereby consent to be sued in a cross-bill
by the defendant seeking (1) to enjoin the state commissioner of
highways from maintaining an obstruction to the abandoned entrance
and (2) to require the building of another access road to the high-
way.12 It must be remembered that Tennessee has no provision for
a compulsory counterclaim, and consent of the state to be sued is
not readily implied.
II. PARTIES
1. Capacity To Sue-Corporation.-A corporation, the charter of
9. Martin v. Dealers Transp. Co., 342 S.W.2d 245 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
10. Kneeland v. Bruce, 336 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
11. G. H. Swope Bldg. Corp. v. Horton, 338 S.W.2d 566 (Tenn. 1960).
12. State v. Williams, 343 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1961).
[ VOL . 141358
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
which has been forfeited, has no capacity to sue in an action against
a defendant for damages for the destruction of chattels owned by
the corporation before its dissolution. The interest of the corporation
in the chattels passed to the stockholders. After revocation of its
charter, the corporation had no legal existence for the purpose of
action as plaintiff.1
3
2. Capacity To Be Sued-Action by Wife Against Husband.-A
wife has no capacity to sue her husband for an injury negligently in-
flicted by him upon her during marriage. In truth, in Tennessee she
has no substantive right to remuneration for such injuries. Conse-
quently, a later divorce, while creating capacity to sue, does not
create any right to remuneration. Hence a demurrer to a plea in
abatement to a complaint alleging negligent injury to the plaintiff
wife during marriage and a subsequent annulment of the voidable
marriage was properly sustained. This decision makes it clear that
the facts stated constituted a defense on the merits and not a dilatory
defense.14 The court made no point of the misnomer of the defense,
and it would have been an obvious waste of time to make the case
turn upon it.
III. REMEDIES
A. Certiorari-Scope of Remedy
1. To Election Commissioners.-The writ of certiorari will not be
granted on petition of privrate citizens complaining of wrongful con-
duct by public officials unless the complaining citizens aver a special
interest or a special injury not common to the general public, and it
will not be granted to determine the qualification of a member of a
county election commission for the office. It is said that this matter
of qualification rests entirely with the election commission. 15
2. Writ to Public Service Commission.-The public service com-
mission is an administrative body and not a court. On certiorari the
court cannot examine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
commission's finding or decision, except to determine whether the
commission acted arbitrarily or in excess of its jurisdiction or other-
wise illegally. Tennessee Code Annotated section 65-229 (d) has been
adjudged entirely ineffective to authorize the court to weigh the
evidence. The commission's decision is final if supported by any
material evidence.16
13. Bland v. Knox Concrete Prods., Inc., 338 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1960).
14. Gordon v. Pollard, 336 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1960).
15. Buford v. State Bd. of Elections, 334 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1960).
16. City of Whitwell v. Fowler, 343 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1961); Blue Ridge
Transp. Co. v. Pentecost, 343 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn.'1961).
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3. Common Law and Statutory Writs.-The common law writ is
embodied in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-801; the statutory
writ in lieu of an appeal in section 27-802. The common law writ is
not applicable to review an order of a trial judge denying an accused's
right to take depositions of the state's witnesses or to inspect the
reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This is an interlocu-
tory order within the court's discretion. The writ has never been
employed to inquire into the correctness of a judgment rendered
where the court had jurisdiction.17 This is true in a habeas corpus
proceeding, the prayer of which is to be allowed bail.
B. Mandamus-To County Court-Ministerial Duty
Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-201 (5) the county court
has a duty to issue bonds upon an affirmative vote of the majority in
a referendum election previously ordered by the court, and has no
discretion to refuse to do so. Mandamus is the proper remedy. The
sole question for argument before the chancellor was whether the
duty was legislative, discretionary, or ministerial.'8
C. Quo Warranto-Burden of Proof and Presumptions
In a quo warranto attacking the validity of an ordinance relating
to annexation of territory to a city, the burden of showing its in-
validity is upon the party alleging invalidity. The court says also that
there is a presumption of its validity, but the relation between the
presumption and the burden of persuasion is not discussed. The court
distinguishes cases of this character from those seeking to oust an
official from office. 19
D. Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Bill in Equity-Jurisdiction of
Chancery
In a bill in equity the complainant executrix alleged that she was
prevented by fraud of the defendant from filing timely exceptions
in the county court to claims against the estate and from interposing
proper defenses. The chancellor sustained defendant's plea that
chancery had no jurisdiction, after the complainant by amendment
sought by a writ of error coram nobis relief from the county court's
judgment for the claimants. The supreme court affirmed. The writ
of error coram nobis lies only in the court in which the judgment was
entered; therefore, the chancery court is without jurisdiction to en-
17. McGee v. State, 340 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tenn. 1960); Ivey v. State, 340
S.W.2d 907 (Tenn. 1960).
18. Lamb v. State, 338 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1960).
19. State ex rel. Senff v. City of Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1961).
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tertain this bill as a writ of error coram nobis. As a bill in equity,
the record shows a hearing but nothing as to the evidence; and on the
record the plaintiff had a plain, adequate, speedy remedy by appeal
to the court of appeals or to the supreme court.20
E. Declaratory Judgment
1. To Determine Construction or Validity of Statute.-Tennessee
Code Annotated section 49-105, as amended in 1957, authorizes an
action by one political subdivision against another in the same county
or against the county without the consent of the commissioner of
education. Hence an action by the Board of Education of Memphis
City Schools may be maintained against Shelby County for a judg-
ment declaring unconstitutional a statute in so far as it affects the
distribution of school funds.21
2. Pending Action of Same Issues.-Claimant had filed two claims
against an estate in county court and the county judge at his request
had ordered one claim nonsuited without prejudice; claimant had
signed a release for the other and the executrix had appealed from
the order of nonsuit. She then sought in the circuit court a declara-
tory judgment for adjudication of the claims with a trial by jury.
On defendant's motion the court dismissed the action. On appeal
the dismissal was sustained. Plaintiff had a speedy, adequate remedy
in the pending case by simply filing exceptions to the claim and
following the remedy provided in Tennessee Code Annotated sections
30-517, -518.22
IV. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
A. Burden of Proof
1. Allocation.--In an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff
has the burden of persuading the trier of malice and of lack of
probable cause.2 In a workmen's compensation case the claimant
has the burden of proving to the trier the causal connection between
his work and the injury-in this case a heart attack. The only
question on appeal from the finding of the trial judge is whether
it has any substantial evidence to support it.24
2. Venue in Criminal Case.-The burden of persuasion on the issue
of venue in a criminal case is that on an, issue in an ordinary civil
20. Rowan v. Inman, 338 S.W.2d 578 (Tenn. 1960).
21. Board of Educ. v. Shelby County, 339 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1960).
22. Trice v. Cheatham, 344 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. 1961).
23. Cohen v. Ferguson, 336 S.W.2d 949 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
24. Jakes v. Union Carbide Nuclear Co., 334 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1960).
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action. It is usually said that venue must be proved by a proponder-
ance of the evidence, for proper venue is not an ingredient of a crimi-
nal offense.2 5
B. Presumptions
1. Presumption of Innocence-On Appeal From Conviction.-It is
frequently said that in Tennessee on appeal from a judgment of con-
viction the presumption of innocence is replaced by the presumption
of guilt. What is meant is that the appellant has the burden of
persuading the court that on the record the preponderance of the
evidence is against the verdict of guilty.26
2. Presumption of Regularity and Legaity.-In extradition pro-
ceedings when the Governor has granted extradition there is a pre-
sumption that all the preliminary papers and proceedings were in due
form.2 7 An officer having a writ of execution is legally authorized to
issue a garnishment summons only after he has been unable to find
in his county personal property of the debtor sufficient to satisfy the
execution; consequently when he issues such a summons, there is a
presumption that he has been unable to find such property.8
3. Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The authorities are in some conflict as to
whether a situation which makes applicable the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur creates a presumption. It is the Tennessee view that it
merely makes the question of negligence one for the jury; it does not
affect either the burden of producing evidence or the burden of
persuasion.
29
4. In Will Contest-Undue Influence.-In Tennessee the establish-
ment of the fact that the principal beneficiary was in a confidential
relationship with the testator and caused the will to be drafted and
executed creates a presumption that the beneficiary exercised undue
influence upon testator and casts upon the beneficiary the burden of
persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that
he did not exercise such influence.30
V. EVIDENCE
A. Objections
1. Necessity-Form.-Where inadmissible evidence has been ad-
25. Norton v. State, 343 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 1961).
26. Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1961); Anderson v. State, 341
S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1960).
27. State v. Turner, 338 S.W.2d 558 (Tenn. 1960).
28. General Truck Sales v. Simmons, 343 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1961).
29. Capital Airlines v. Barger, 341 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
30. Kelley v. Brading, 337 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
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mitted without objection, and evidence in rebuttal is received over
objection, the error, if any, is harmless. 31 This case suggests the
problem raised when one party introduces inadmissible evidence,
either without objection or over objection by the adverse party.
Is inadmissible evidence to be received for the adversary over ob-
jection in rebuttal? The authorities are in conflict.
2. Form of Objection.-The objection to the admissibility of written
or printed matter must be specific and state the grounds upon which
the objector is relying. A pamphlet dealing with safety regulations
concerning so-called manlifts which had been adopted by the De-
partment of Labor of Tennessee was offered in evidence by plaintiff;
defendant objected on grounds variously stated to the effect that
these regulations had no legal effect in Tennessee. The court held
the objection not sufficiently specific and charged the jury in effect
that this evidence was to be considered only in determining the
standard of safety that an ordinarily prudent person would observe
under similar conditions. 32 The ruling as to the relevance of the
evidence is in accord with the great majority of decisions. Of course
a compliance with general practice may or may not constitute due
care.
B. Opinion-Expert Opinion-Hypothetical Question
Where an objection to a hypothetical question is made on the ground
that the stated hypothesis is incomplete, the burden is upon th
objector to point out what has been omitted.33 A hypothetical ques-
tion which assumes the existence of a fact as to which no evidence
has been received is properly rejected on objection.34
C. Hearsay
1. Generally.-The rules governing the admissibility of hearsay
evidence are applicable in a workmen's compensation case. A finding
based solely on inadmissible hearsay received over objection is un-
supported and must be reversed.35 This, of course, must be dis-
tinguished from a finding based on hearsay to which no objection
has been made, for in that event the evidence is entitled to be con-
sidered for what it is intrinsically worth.
2. Exceptions-(a) Confessions.-Where objection is made to evi-
dence of a confession by a party on the ground that it was improperly
31. Harper v. State, 334 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1960).
32. Jack M. Bass & Co. v. Parker, 343 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1961).
33. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Gregory, 334 S.W.2d 939 (Tenn. 1960).
34. Moon v. Johnston, 337 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
35. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Gregory, 334 S.W.2d 939 (Tenn. 1960).
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induced, the judge alone determines admissibility and if the evidence
is received, the jury is the judge of its weight but has nothing to do
with the question of admissibility. This orthodox rule still prevails
in Tennessee. 36 There are many cases in other jurisdictions which
have modified this rule by giving to the jury some functions with
reference to admissibility. These have been strongly disapproved by
Wigmore.
(b) Mental Condition of Confessor.-Uniform Rule of Evidence
63 (6) requires as a condition of admissibility of a confession a finding
by the judge that the accused when making the statement was
conscious and capable of understanding what he said and did. This
does not seem to be inconsistent with cases holding, as does Ten-
nessee, that the fact that the accused was drunk at the time does not
render the confession inadmissible but affects only its weight.37 The
rule is doubtless intended to cover situations which thus far have
not occurred in Tennessee, so far as shown by the decisions, namely,
confessions while accused is under the influence of drugs which
are inaccurately classed as "truth serum," or while accused is asleep.38
(c) Confession of Accomplice.-It goes without saying that a con-
fession by one other than the accused is as against the accused mere
hearsay and is inadmissible against him except on a showing which
would make confessor a speaking agent of the accused. This problem
is most frequently met where one accused is on trial with an alleged
accomplice as a co-defendant. The confession of the accomplice is
admissible against the accomplice co-defendant. In almost every
case it will be received, accompanied by a cautionary instruction that
it is to be used only against the accomplice. An example of this
accepted practice is found in Smith v. State.39
(d) Reputation-Character-Issues.-Evidence of reputation as
proof of good character of accused in a criminal case, if offered by
him, is admissible on the issue of guilt when it concerns a relevant
trait of character, and if accused is a witness, on the issue of credi-
bility. When an accused had lived in a community from birth to adult
manhood, and after an absence of five years had returned and lived
there for several months before the alleged offense, it was reversible
error to reject evidence of his good character in that community be-
fore the period of absence and after his return. This was especially
true when the offense charged was a sex offense with a female twelve
36. Kyle v. State, 344 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1961).
37. Harper v. State, 334 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1960).
38. See Dession, 'Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation
and Criminal Investigation, 62 YA.E L.J. 315 (1953).
39. 338 S.W.2d 610 (Tenn. 1960).
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1. Competency-Dead Man Statute.-In an action involving the
validity of a claim against the estate of a decedent, the adminis-
trator called the claimant as his witness. On cross examination
the witness was permitted over objection to testify to conversations
with the decedent notwithstanding the requirement of exclusion of
such evidence by Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-105. As a
preliminary question on an appeal by the claimant from an adverse
judgment, the court considered the admissibility of this testimony
and held that the county judge was right both in his ruling on
admissibility and in his finding on the whole evidence against the
claimant.41 The testimony was a proper part of the cross examination
of the administrator's witness.
2. Credibility-Falsus in Uno.-A charge to the jury that it is
their duty to disregard entirely the uncorroborated testimony of a
witness who may be found to have sworn falsely upon a material
matter is reversible error. The statement in the charge "you will
disregard entirely" is in effect mandatory. It is true that the jury
may disregard such testimony. The court regards the mandatory
instruction as a violation of the proponent's constitutional right of
trial by jury.
42
3. Privilege-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.-It is not the
duty of the sheriff when an accused surrenders to him to inform
accused of his right to refuse to answer and that what he says may
be used against him. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-1101
imposes this duty upon the committing magistrate; without an
applicable statute there is no such duty.43 This, of course, is not to
say that if he declines to answer under a claim of privilege not to
criminate himself, he can be required to do so, even when his
criminatory answer is only an admission as distinguished from a
confession.
VII. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
1. Parol Evidence Rule.-The courts of Tennessee frequently
purport to give effect to the generalization that extrinsic evidence is
40. Strader v. State, 344-S.W.2d 546 (Tenn. 1961).
41. Cotton v. Roberts' Estate, 337 S.W.2d776 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
42. Shook & Fletcher Supply.Co v. City of Nashville, 338 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1960).
43. Cordell v. State, 338 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. 1960).
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inadmissible to vary the terms of an unambiguous writing or the
plain meaning of a writing.44 This may be a very convenient method
of phrasing the result after the court has heard and considered the
extrinsic evidence and finds that it should be given no operative
effect. But the actual operation of such a rule is shown in a recent
case. The defendant insurance company had issued a five-year policy
upon a description of the insured premises as a "two story block and
brick Tourist dwelling and office containing 11 units," with permis-
sion to make "alterations, additions and repairs." The issue was
whether this description in the policy and its renewal covered an
adjoining dwelling acquired two years after the date of the original
policy and then converted into three motel units. The court stressed
the failure of the assured to make any change in the renewal policy
or to show any knowledge on the part of the insurance company
(through its agent) and held the additional units not covered.45 Why
not declare that the language was too clear to require construction or
to permit extrinsic evidence?
Our courts also frequently state that the parol evidence rule ap-
plies only to the parties to the writing and not to a controversy be-
tween one of the parties to the writing and a stranger. The leading
text writers insist that where the issue is what legal relations were
created by the writing between the parties to it, the parol evidence
rule operates with full effect. This subject is involved in the case of
Memphis Street Ry. v. Williams,46 which is reviewed in the section on
contracts in this Survey.
2. Condition-Oral Agreement of Conditional Delivery.-As between
the original payee and one who signs as a co-maker at payee's request,
an agreement that the co-maker shall be only an accommodation
maker is valid and effective. Thus, where a payee was unable to
procure a discount of a note by a bank on the credit of the maker
and defendant at his (payee's) request signed as accommodation
maker, the arrangement was provable by parol and defendant in-
curred no liability to the payee.47
VIII. JuDicIAL NOTICE
1. Where Applicable.-Thayer pointed out that the courts applied
the doctrine of judicial notice "wherever the process of reasoning has
a place and that is everywhere." A good illustration is found in the
44. Greene County Tire & Supply Inc. v. Spurlin, 338 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn.
1960).
45. McKee v. Potomac Ins. Co., 344 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. 1961).
46. 338 S.W.2d 639 (Tenn. App. 1959).
47. Cross v. Miner, 338 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1960).
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opinion of Judge Howard in the Capital Airlines case.48 In 1935
the court had held that it judicially noticed that it was a common
and not an unusual occurrence for airplanes to stall and fall in
operation without the intervention of the operator, and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur had no application in such a situation. Judge
Howard noted the marked progress in airplane construction and
operation since 1935 which made the reasoning in the earlier pre-
cedent inapplicable and applied -the doctrine in a case of a totally
unexplained crash of an airplane as it approached the landing run-
way. He did not use the phrase "judicial notice."
2. Matters of Common Knowledge.-The supreme court has taken
judicial notice that "recapping or repairing of automobile and truck
tires is a common type of business likely to be found in most
counties of the state." It weighed this fact in considering the 'validity
of a promise of a seller not to compete with the buyer within a
designated area.49 And in determining what rights, if any, an
abutting owner had to direct access to a limited-access highway, it
took judicial notice that limited-access highways are being con-
structed throughout this country, variously designated as freeways,
throughways, express ways, parkways or belt lines, and that they
are essential to public welfare and progress.50
IX. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. Jurisdiction
1. Of Person-Under Hit-and-Run Statute.-The non-resident par-
ents of a minor who joined in signing the minor's application for a
license to operate a motor vehicle in Tennessee (Tennessee Code
Annotated section 59-704, 1959 Supplement) are subject to service of
process in an action for injuries inflicted by him in driving as licensee
under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-224 as amended, by ser-
vice upon the secretary of state.51 (But it should be noted that they
are relieved of liability on filing with the department of safety proof
of the minor's financial responsibility with respect to the accident
which is the basis of the action.)
2. Jurisdiction of Subject Matter-(a) Actions Against Commis-
sioner of Department of Insurance.-Only the courts of Davidson
County have jurisdiction of actions or proceedings against the com-
48. Capital Airlines v. Barger, 341 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. App. 1960).
49. Greene County Tire & Supply Inc. v. Spurlin, 338 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn.
1960).
50. State ex rel. Moulton v. Williams, 343 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1961).
51. Leggett v. Crossnoe, 336 S.W.2d I (Tenn. 1960).
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missioner of insurance and banking. Hence, when the chancery court
of Shelby County granted certiorari to review a cease and desist order
of the commissioner and refused to quash the writ and dismiss the
proceedings, the supreme court granted certiorari in lieu of an appeal.
It entered a decree dismissing the proceedings in the Shelby County
court.
52
(b) Concurrent Jurisdiction-Chancery Court and Circuit Court.-
The chancellor has jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated
section 16-692 of actions triable in circuit court except actions for
unliquidated damages for injuries to person, to character, or to
property. It has jurisdiction to try an action for damages for fraud
or deceit.5
3
(c) Priority.-A court which first secures jurisdiction of an action
of which another court has concurrent jurisdiction retains the action.
Consequently when an action of unlawful detainer is properly begun
before a justice of the peace, a bill in equity to enjoin the proceedings
before him is subject to demurrer, and a temporary injunction
previously granted therein is properly dissolved upon the chancellor's
decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the suit.5 4
(d) Continuing Jurisdiction-Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.-The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Knox County
is a single court. It has jurisdiction of a proceeding to have a child
declared delinquent and to award temporary custody of the child to
the grandmother. It retains jurisdiction over the child adjudged de-
linquent or dependent until the child reaches majority. No other
court, including a criminal court in a habeas corpus proceeding, has
power to change the child's custody or make orders concerning it
without the consent of the juvenile court.55
3. Continuing Jurisdiction in Eminent Domain.-In 1955 in an
eminent domain proceeding the jury of view determined the amount
due for a parcel of land containing several smaller contiguous
parcels. In 1959 the owner of one of the smaller parcels petitioned
to have the case restored to the docket to determine how the amount
should be distributed between the several owners. The trial judge
ruled that he had no jurisdiction. The supreme court, reversing,
held that the court retained jurisdiction to determine the boundaries
of the smaller parcels and distribute the award accordingly.6
52. Delta Loan & Fin. Co. v. Long, 336 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. 1960).
53. Kneeland v. Bruce, 336 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
54. Robinson v. Easter, 344 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn. 1961).
55. Kidd v. State ex rel. Moore, 338 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. 1960).
56. City of Maryville v. Waters, 338 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. 1960).
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4. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court in Criminal Case.-The supreme
court in a criminal case has the power to revise the action of the
trial judge but where the function of fixing the punishment is vested
by statute in the jury, it has no power to revise. If the sentence
imposed by the jury is within the limits fixed by the statute, it
cannot be considered excessive.
57
5. On Certiorari to Court of Appeals.-The supreme court has
jurisdiction on certiorari from the court of appeals to review only
its final judgments and decrees. It has no jurisdiction to review
interlocutory orders in a civil case.58
6. To Issue Certiorari To Review Interlocutory Order of a Lower
Court.-The supreme court has jurisdiction to issue the common law
writ to review an interlocutory order or decree of a lower court only
where (1) the court has exceeded its jurisdiction or (2) where in the
judgment of the court there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy and the case is one of merit. Where the pleading of petitioner
disclosed that the controversy was one over which the circuit court
had jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 30-509 to
-525, including the question whether the claim involved had been
fully paid as alleged, the supreme court will not grant the writ but
will remit petitioners to their usual remedy by appeal. Where the
lower court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, error in its exer-
cise is not remediable by certiorari.5 9
B. Venue-Waiver of Right To Change
Where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter but the venue
is wrong, a defendant by going to trial waives his right to have the
venue changed. The prescribed venue is not an element of jurisdic-
tion in a civil action.60 This is the generally recognized rule in the
interpretation of statutes regulating venue in civil actions.
X. TRiAL
1. Motion for Continuance-Required Supporting Affidavits.-A
motion for a continuance on the ground of absence of a material
witness must be supported by affidavits of counsel and moving party
showing the expected testimony, the diligence used to secure the
absentee's attendance and further matter concerning him. An oral
motion during trial, unsupported by affidavits, is properly denied.6'
57. Broyles v. State, 341 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. 1960).
58. State-Wide Sales Fin. Corp. v. Long, 337 S.W.2d 239 (Tenn. 1960).
59. Hewgley v. Trice, 340 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tenn. 1960).
60. Kelley v. Brading, 337 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
61. Neal v. State, 334 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1960).
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But the refusal to postpone a hearing in a will contest to secure the
deposition of the proponent and chief beneficiary who was ill at the
time set for taking the deposition upon the issue of the exercise of
undue influence by the proponent was error. Whether or not it was
an abuse of discretion will depend upon other evidence at the new
trial ordered on other grounds.62
2. Examination of Witness-Inadmissible Testimony Volunteered.
-Where a witness on direct examination volunteers a prejudicial
opinion in an answer to a perfectly proper question of the prosecuting
attorney, and where the court (1) promptly sustains the objection,
(2) the attorney immediately "withdraws that," and (3) the judge
then instructs the jury to disregard the statement of the witness, the
court does not commit reversible error in denying defendant's motion
for a mistrial.6
3
3. Motion To Reopen After Close of Testimony.-A motion to re-
open after the close of the testimony to permit the moving party to
offer further evidence may be granted or denied within the discre-
tion of the trial judge. Thus, he may properly reopen to allow the
proponent of a will to call the third subscribing witness.64 But it is
an abuse of discretion to continue a case after the close of the
testimony to enable counsel to go to a distant city and bring back
a witness where it appears (1) that counsel knew of the existence
of the witness while he was at the place of trial and (2) the content
of his testimony was known to the trial attorney's firm and (3) the
presence of the witness could then have been ascertained. But the
appellate court after reviewing the entire record in detail held that
the error did not affirmatively appear to have affected the verdict and
affirmed the judgment entered on the verdict.
65
4. Instructions to Jury-Requested Instruction.-In Harper v. StateG6
the court repeats and applies the settled rule, which counsel so
often fail to observe, that a trial judge may refuse a requested
instruction unless it is strictly accurate.
5. As to Jury's Function in Criminal Case.-In Cordell v. State
67
the court, speaking through Justice Swepston, makes a careful ex-
planation of the Tennessee rule which makes the jury the judge of
the law in criminal cases. The trial judge had charged: "The law
makes it the duty of the court to give in charge to the jury the law
62. Kelley v. Brading, 337 SW.2d 471 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
63. Cordell v. State, 338 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. 1960).
64. Kelley v. Brading, 337 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
65. Higgins v. Steide, 335 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
66. 334 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1960).
67. 338 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. 1960).
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relative to the case on trial; and of the jury to carefully consider
all the evidence delivered to them on the trial, and under the law
given them by the court, render their verdict with absolute im-
partiality." In upholding the judgment of conviction, the court said:
"It is (1) the duty of the court to give in charge to the jury the
law relative to the case; (2) the duty of the jury to consider carefully
all the evidence; (3) to consider it under the law as given them by
the court; if not, why charge the law at all; and (4) actually the
charge is exactly in accord with the charge approved in Ford v.
State, 101 Tenn. 454, 461 and 462, 47 S.W. 601."
It seems obvious that hereafter a trial judge will need no further
instruction in framing his charge upon the respective functions of
the judge and jury in compliance with the requirement in article II,
section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution that "the jury shall have
the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of
the court." There can be no reason for repeating such mistakes as
charging the jury that they "cannot disregard the law as given by the
court."6
8
6. Written in Criminal Case.-The requirement of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-2516 that every word of the charge in a criminal
case must be in writing was not violated where the charge as written
contained an inapplicable instruction with lines drawn through it
indicating that it was stricken. The stricken portion, even if legible,
did not constitute a part of the charge and no prejudice to the accused
resulted.69
7. Submitting Issue Not Made by Pleadings or Evidence.-In an
action for wrongful death the court submitted to the jury (1) an
issue as to Town's employing an inexperienced, reckless and childish
man as a policeman and (2) an issue on the prohibition of shooting
in an effort to recapture a misdemeanant. The first issue was made
by the pleadings but there was no evidence upon it; the second was
not made by either the pleadings or the evidence. The court held
that the charge was prejudicially erroneous in both respects.70
(a) Ambiguity.-In a trial of an action of a son for his personal
injuries and an action by his father for expenses and loss of services,
the charge as to damages in the son's action included "loss of time
and decreased capacity for earning as may be proven," and in the
father's action included "loss of services as may be proven." ie-
68. Scott v. State, 338 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1960).
69. Tomlin v. State, 339 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1960).




fendant's objection was that the charge allowed double recovery as to
the son's earnings. The court held that this interpretation was not
the only reasonable meaning and that the defendant should have
requested a clarifying instruction. Otherwise there was no showing
of prejudicial error21
(b) Mandatory Instruction-Directed Verdict.-In an action for
wrongful death resulting from injuries in a collision of automobiles
plaintiff presented only two witnesses neither of whom saw the
collision. One of them testified that after the collision defendant's
truck was on its proper side of the unmarked center line and the
other that a portion of the truck extended across that line. There
was no evidence as to the speed, relative weight of the vehicles, or
any other relevant data. The trial judge granted defendant's motion
for a verdict in his favor. On appeal the court of appeals reversed.
On certiorari the supreme court agreed with the trial judge and
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The relative positions
of these colliding vehicles after the collision did not of itself furnish
the basis for an inference of their positions before the collision.72
XI. VERDICT
A. General-Complaint With Several Counts
Under the common law rule as generally accepted, a general
verdict for plaintiff whose complaint contained several counts for
the same injury must be supported by evidence sufficient to justify
the finding on all counts. This, because it was impossible to deter-
mine that the jury had not found for plaintiff upon the unsupported
count. In Tennessee the rule is otherwise; if there is evidence suffici-
ent to support any count, an objection that there is no evidence to
support the verdict must be overruled7 3 The defendant may protect
himself by requesting a separate finding on each count.
B. Error in Directing Verdict
1. Validity of Non-Unanimous Verdict.-After the jury had failed
to agree during pending deliberations, the parties agreed to accept a
verdict by a majority of the jury. After verdict by seven jurors for
plaintiff and judgment thereon, defendant moved for a new trial
on the ground that the court had wrongfully denied his motion for a
directed verdict. The appellate court held that the motion should
have been granted assuming that the stipulation was valid; Judge
71 Mullins v. Murphree, 345 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
72. McCollum v. Guest, 343 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. 1960).
73. Smith Packing Co. v. Tinnin, 340 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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Carney dissented on the ground that the stipulation was void as
against public policy. The right to a trial by a jury of twelve is not
subject to waiver.7 4 The majority opinion is in accord with the
overwhelming weight of authority. The right to trial by jury in a
civil case is a personal privilege which may be waived.
2. Special Verdict by Answers to Interrogatories.-In Holcomb v.
Steele, 5 two women, H and S, riding in one car were injured in a
collision of the car with another car driven by a third woman, X. The
finding of the jury in an action by H against S in which attorney A
intervened was that in handling the claim of H, the intervenor A
was guilty of negligence which would have resulted in prejudice to
H had A not been discharged by H. In answer to another question
they found that A did not solicit employment to handle the claim of
H against X. The court held that the findings were not inconsistent
and that the first above-mentioned finding was conclusive that the
negligent conduct of A was a breach of his duty to his client and a
bar to his claim for fees.
C. Polling the Jury-Method
Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1324 the manner in
which the trial judge conducts the poll is within his discretion. All
that is essential is that the answer of each juror shall indicate with
reasonable certainty that the verdict is his own.
7 6
XII. JUDGMENT
A. What Constitutes Judgment-Award by State Board of Claims
An award by the state board of claims to a claimant for injuries
inflicted by a state highway patrolman has the effect of a judgment.
Claimant's acceptance of the amount awarded operates as the satis-
faction of a judgment and bars a later action against an alleged
joint tortfeasor for damages caused by the joint tort.7 7 Obviously the
award is not strictly a judgment, but its receipt is full satisfaction
of the claim against the state. Should the analogy to be followed
be that of a release or that of a covenant not to sue?
B. Res Adjudicata
1. Decision in Habeas Corpus-Effect of Failure To Appeal Where
in a habeas corpus proceeding by a petitioner imprisoned pursuant to
74. Cohen v. Ferguson, 336 S.W.2d 949 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
75. 342 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
76. Smith v. Weitzel, 338 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
77. Schoenly v. Nashville Speedways, Inc., 344 S.W.2d 349 (Tenn. 1961).
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a judgment of conviction the court held the judgment void and re-
manded petitioner for trial under the pending indictment, there was
no proceeding pending under the statute under which the petitioner
was indicted. Consequently, when that statute was repealed, the
petitioner was no longer triable under the indictment. The saving
clause in Tennessee Code Annotated section 1-301 was not applicable
to keep the repealed statute in force as to petitioner's offense.78
2. Effect of Consent Decree.-A consent decree operates as res
adjudicata between the parties and is not subject to attack by any
of them except for fraud or mistake.7
9
3. Records of Previous Litigation on Disbarment Proceedings.-The
records of previous cases in which the attorney was a party or an
attorney for a party are not conclusive as to the facts stated or
litigated therein. They are receivable as evidence against him to be
considered upon the issue of his fitness to practice.80
4. Reasons Stated for Decision.-Where costs were awarded to an
unsuccessful contestant in a wills case by the court of appeals on
the ground that in the circumstances it was conceivable that the
contest might result in benefit to the estate, the judgment was final
as to the award, but not as to the fact asserted to be conceivable.8'
C. Judgment-When Effective-Ambiguity in Record Date
At the conclusion of the hearing in a divorce action on June 9,
1953, the court orally announced judgment of divorce but the formal
decree was not entered on the minutes until June 17, 1953. There
was an ambiguity as to the applicability of Rule 12 of the Chancery
Court of Shelby County providing that the court may permit decrees
to become effective as of the time of the decision. This ambiguity
was resolved by parol evidence and the record was corrected by a
nunc pro tunc order in 1960 making the decree effective as of the
time of its entry on June 9, 1953.82 This made valid the marriage of
one of the parties on the afternoon of June 9, 1953.
XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL--GROUNDS
A. Misconduct in Jury Room
In Tennessee objective misconduct in the jury room is a ground
for a new trial and may be shown by testimony of members of the
78. Stinson v. State, 344 S.W.2d 369 (Tenn. 1961).
79. Burton v. Burton, 343 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. 1961).
80. Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 344 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
81. In re Eppinger's Estate, 336 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1960).
82. McCown v. Quillin, 344 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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jury. Thus, in an action against a county official, statements made in
the jury room during the deliberations of the jury concerning their
own experiences and the alleged generally known unjustifiable con-
duct of the officials of the county, of which defendants were officials,
was in effect receiving testimony of persons not sworn as witnesses
and not subject to cross examination. Denial of defendants' motion
for a new trial was reversible error.8 3
1. Quotient Verdict.-Determining the amount of damages by an
agreement to abide by the quotient of the sum total of the separate
amounts submitted divided by the number of jurors is reversible
misconduct and a verdict returned pursuant to the agreement cannot
stand. But such a verdict reached without a previous agreement to
abide by it is not objectionable. 84 In the case at bar the judgment on
the verdict was reversed for other reasons, so that this statement is
useful only as a guide for the jury at the new trial. Making such
an agreement obviously constitutes objective misconduct.
B. Newly Discovered Evidence-Sufficiency
Newly discovered evidence which would be admissible only to
impeach the testimony of a witness at the trial is of itself an insuf-
ficient ground for granting a new trial, even in a criminal case.8 5
XIV. APPEAL AND ERROR
A. What Is Appealable
1. Where a defendant has confessed judgment for fine and costs
with sureties under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-3202, an
attempted appeal by him, whether allowed or not, is a total nullity
and has no effect upon the judgment or its finality.86
2. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 70-310 an appeal lies
to the supreme court from the judgments and decrees of the Chancery
Court of Davidson County in a proceeding by the stream pollution
board to compel compliance with its orders. Hence the board's
petition to the supreme court for certiorari and supersedeas will be
denied when the petition for the writ and the record contain only the
pleadings including the defendant's cross claim. 87
B. Necessary Preliminaries
1. Prayer for Leave To Appeal-Necessity.-There must be in
83. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hoard, 340 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
84. Mayor of Town of Morristown v. Inman, 342 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1960).
85. Harper v. State, 334 S.W.2d 933 (Term. 1960).
86. McInturff v. State, 338 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. 1960).
87. Tennessee Stream Pollution Bd. v. Resha, 343 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. 1961).
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form a prayer for leave to appeal and an allowance of appeal. In
truth the record recital of the prayer and allowance is usually the
recital of events that do not occur. Where within the time prescribed
for perfecting an appeal the judge entered an order reciting that
defendant "for good cause shown is allowed until March 15, 1960,
to perfect his appeal and file bill of exceptions" there is a necessary
implication that the appeal was prayed and granted.88 And where the
trial judge refuses leave to appeal, the aggrieved party is not without
a remedy. Where the trial judge refused leave to appeal after sus-
taining defendant's demurrer, plaintiff was granted certiorari by the
court of appeals, which held that the order sustaining the demurrer
was erroneous; the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded.89
2. Time-After Correction of Mistake in Technical Record.-Where
an error is apparent on the face of the technical record, as the mis-
calculation of the product of two specific numerals set forth in the
record, it may be corrected at any time, even after final judgment.
The correction is effective as of the date of the original decree, and
the time for the motion for a new trial or rehearing begins to run
from that date. After the expiration of the prescribed period, the
trial court has no power to entertain such a motion, and any order
then made granting the motion is of no effect. Final judgment must
be entered for the correct amount. (Tennessee Code Annotated sec-
tions 27-201, -1512).90
(a) For Order Extending Time for Bill of Exceptions.-An order
extending the time for filing a bill of exceptions beyond thirty days
must be made and filed within the thirty days. If made and filed or
left for filing within that period, it may be entered on the minutes
later, nunc pro tunc. But the judge has no authority to grant an
extension after the expiration of the thirty-day period; an order
timely made but not filed within the period is void and must be
stricken.91
3. Bill of Exceptions-Necessity-Effect of Lack.-To authorize
review of any errors not appearing in the technical record, a bill of
exceptions is necessary. In the absence of such a bill the court will
consider only the technical record and limit its action to errors ap-
pearing therein.92 Thus, in an election contest the supreme court
on appeal from the decree of the chancellor will affirm the decree
where there is no bill of exceptions and no error is revealed in the
88. Gray v. State, 336 S.W.2d 22 (Tenn. 1960).
89. McHendry v. Anderson, 344 S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
90. Moore v. Brannan, 341 S.W.2d 382 (Tenn. 1960).
91. Thomas v. State, 337 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1960).
92. Holcomb v. Steele, 342 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
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technical record.93 Incidentally, it is very important to observe what
items the Tennessee courts hold to be part of the technical record.
They do not agree with the orthodox common law decisions.
4. Motion for New Trial-(a).-An appeal to the supreme court in
a workman's compensation case is not an equity appeal but an appeal
in the nature of a writ of error. A motion for a new trial is a pre-
liminary requisite, and the absence of such a motion is a ground
for dismissing the appeal.94 Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-
303 is not applicable.
(b).-In Green v. State95 the supreme court found a conflict between
the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-303 and those
of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2907, both of which were
included in the 1950 Code Supplement. The latter specifically re-
quires a bill of exceptions and a motion for a new trial in proceedings
for revocation of a suspended sentence, and is not modified by sec-
tion 27-303 which is generally applicable to non-jury trials. Hence
a motion to dismiss an appeal from a decision revoking the suspen-
sion of a sentence on the ground of failure to move for a new trial
was granted.
(c).-In a prosecution for unlawful receipt and possession of in-
toxicating liquor in which the liquor had been seized by state officers,
the defendant at the trial demanded production of the seized liquor
and the court ordered production. On the prosecution's failure to obey
the order for the reason stated by the prosecuting attorney-that it
was impossible then to identify that liquor because it had been
commingled with other confiscated liquor-the court dismissed the
action. The State appealed, and defendant moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground of failure to move for a new trial. The motion
was granted, though the court said that "all the foregoing is reflected
by a minute entry signed by the trial judge." The opinion indicates
that this minute entry was deemed not a part of the technical record.96
(d) .- Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-303, -304 are not
applicable to common law certiorari proceedings to chancery to re-
view action of a city commission in rezoning property, for the chan-
cellor can look only to the evidence introduced before the com-
mission for the purpose of determining whether the commission acted
fraudulently, illegally or in excess of its jurisdiction. The commission
is an administrative body, and the courts have no power to try the
matter de novo as in a simple appeal. Hence the rule requiring a
93. Freeman v. Felts, 344 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. 1961).
94. Hyter v. Wheland Co., 338 S.W.2d 571 (Tenn. 1960).
95. 340 S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. 1960).
96. State v. McCandless, 343 S.W.2d 907 (Tenn. 1961).
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motion for a new trial as a prerequisite to an appeal from the trial
court's decision on certiorari is applicable wherever the court was
required to consider the evidence even for a limited purpose as in this
case.
97
XV. SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. Certiorari to Administrative Tribunal
On certiorari to an administrative tribunal and decisions of the
original reviewing court and further review by higher courts, the
question is whether the administrative tribunal acted fraudulently,
illegally or in excess of its jurisdiction. Thus on common law certio-
rari to review a decision of a city commission in charge of rezoning,98
or on a decision of the Tennessee Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission,99 or a decision of the commissioner of finance and tax-
ation,100 the court in examining the sufficiency of the evidence con-
siders only whether there is any material evidence in support of the
decision, for only if it is wholly without support would the tribunal
or officer be acting illegally.
B. Certiorari to Lower Court
The writ will not be issued to review interlocutory orders or decrees
of a lower court where it appears that the lower court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter and its action constituted only an error in its
exercise of its jurisdiction.1 1
C. On Appeal in Non-Jury Action
On appeal from a judgment or decree tried without the interven-
tion of a jury, the court in applying Tennessee Code Annotated section
27-303 will consider the case de novo as on a simple appeal, with a
presumption that the judgment is correct unless it finds that the
preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. In a divorce action in
which the chancellor heard all the witnesses and observed their
attitude and demeanor on the stand, the court of appeals declared
that appellant must show that the decree was contrary to the clear
preponderance of the evidence. The court gave great weight to the
chancellor's conclusions.102 It must be observed that "clear prepond-
erance" and "great weight" describe only the attitude of the review-
ing court in the particular case. Literally, of course, every prepond-
erance is clear; and the weight of an imponderable is imaginary.
97. City of Memphis v. Sherwood Bldg. Corp., 343 S.W.2d 869 (Tenn. 1961).
98. Ibid.
99. Associated Transp., Inc. v. Fowler, 337 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. 1960).
100. Little v. McFarland, 337 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. 1960).
101. Hewgley v. Trice, 340 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tenn. 1960).
102. Smith v. Smith, 339 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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D. Appeal in Jury-Tried. Cases
1.-In Kent v. Freeman0 3 and Hudson v. Freeman, tried together,
the court says that the question is whether there was evidence to
sustain the verdicts. As to Freeman, the court reviews the undisputed
evidence and holds that the sole proximate cause of the accident was
negligence on the part of defendant's servant; as to Hudson, the
court holds that the undisputed evidence compels the conclusion
that the verdict for plaintiff for an inadequate sum was due to
mistake, accident or caprice. The causes were remanded to the trial
court "for a new trial or trials as the judge may decide," indicating
that the question of consolidation of the actions for trial should be
reconsidered. Why should there be a new trial in the Freeman case?
Did the record indicate that on a new trial the question of remoteness
of plaintiff's negligence might be one for the jury? It is hardly pos-
sible that new evidence could justify a finding as to the conduct of
the defendant's servant and the physical data.
2.-In reviewing the ruling of the trial judge's order in a condemna-
tion case, the court made a remittitur of 683/4 per cent of the amount
of verdict for the plaintiff as shown by the narrative record on appeal
approved by both counsel and by the trial judge. The court in-
terpreted the trial judge's certificate as authenticating the inclusion
of all the evidence upon the issue of the value of the property taken
and incidental damages. It then reviewed all the evidence and found
that the amount of the original verdict was less than 40 per cent
of the average estimated value of the land and less than 75 per cent
of the average amount of incidental damage as shown by the testi-
mony. It therefore set aside the remittitur and entered judgment
upon the original verdict. 0 4
3.-On appeal in reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial
for error in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant, the court will
disregard testimony contrary to established physical facts. Where all
other evidence is such that no reasonable trier could find any negli-
gence of defendant, there is no room for the application of a com-
parative negligence doctrine authorized by statute. The court of
appeals on such a record entered judgment for defendant. 105
XVI. RECORD ON APPEAL-CERTIFICATION OF BILL OF ExCEPTIONS
1.-A recital by the trial judge in an order entered of record that
103. 345 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
104. Chapman v. Mayor of City of Milan, 344 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn App. W.S.
1960).
105. Camurati v. Sutton, 342 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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a tendered bill of exceptions contained only that part of the evidence
received at the trial which was heard on the motion for a new trial
was conclusive; it justified the judge's refusal to sign the tendered
bill.106
2.-Unless the bill of exceptions recites that it contains all the
evidence, the appellate court will presume that the verdict was
supported by the evidence; but a verdict that is erroneous on its
face is to be set aside-the verdict is part of the technical record.
Thus, in an action for personal injuries a verdict for plaintiff "with
no damages" must be set aside.1 07
3.-Errors occurring during the trial will not be considered on
appeal unless contained in the bill of exceptions. Thus if allegedly
inadmissible evidence is received at the trial, and the record shows
no exception to the receipt of the evidence and no motion to strike
it or any part of it, the appellate court will not consider an assign-
ment of error based on the admission of the evidence. There must
be timely objection and exception so that the trial court will have
an opportunity to make proper correction. 08 And the claim that an
unauthorized person was permitted to enter the jury room during the
deliberations of the jury cannot be heard in the appellate court on
affidavits not incorporated in the bill of exceptions. 0 9
4. Disposition by Appellate Court- (a) Remand-When Proper.-
Where it appears upon consideration of the writ of error that the
execution of the decree of the appellate court can be more conven-
iently accomplished by the court below, the case will be remanded
for entry of the decree. The usual practice is to enter the decree in
the appellate court."0 But when the supreme court reverses a de-
cision of the trial judge, there should be no remand for a new trial
in order to allow the appellee to rely upon a theory of trial contrary
to that on which the case was tried. The supreme court should enter
the judgement which the trial court should have rendered."'
(b) Revision-To Cure Error in Rejection or Admission of Evi-
dence.-In a wrongful death action the trial court erroneously
rejected evidence tending to prove lack of affection of decedent
husband toward the beneficiaries, his wife and child, and affection
of decedent for another woman. The court of appeals considered that
106. Holcomb v. Steele, 342 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
107. Clements v. Veterans Cab Co., 344 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
108. Anderson v. State, 341 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1960); Life & Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Jackson, 342 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
109. Arterburn v. State, 344 S.W.2d 362 (Tenn. 1961).
110. Brister v. Brubaker's Estate, 336 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
111. Clendening v. London Assur. Co., 337 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1960).
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its prejudicial effect upon the amount of the verdict would be cured
by a remittitur of ten per cent. The jury's verdict was for $125,000,
the amount of the remittitur $12,500. The supreme court avoided
modifying the judgement of the trial court by a somewhat doubtful
interpretation of the record." 2 In a prosecution for illegally possess-
ing whiskey, the court erroneously admitted evidence that the
accused was a well-known bootlegger. The jury found accused guilty
and fixed his punishment at the maximum fine of $500 and imprison-
ment for six months. The judge had not requested or authorized
the jury to fix the punishment. The trial judge reduced the fine to
the statutory minimum, and sentenced accused to imprisonment for
six months. The supreme court held that though the admission of
the prejudicial evidence influenced the jury's judgment as to
sentence, yet so far as the fine was concerned, the judge's action
cured the error. As to the imprisonment, though the record did not
show that the judge disregarded the jury's verdict, the court held
that the attempt to impose imprisonment was surplusage and that the
judge's fixing the same term should be regarded as the exercise of
his independent judgment, since he had heard the same evidence,
and had he heard it in a proceeding to fix the sentence, it would
have been relevant and competent." 3
XVII. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CASES
A. New Trial-Grounds-Misconduct of Jurors-Quotient Verdict
In support of the claim that the jury reached their verdict "by the
gambling or quotient method" the defendant presented an affidavit
deposing that a local lawyer had reported a double hearsay state-
ment of one juror to the effect that the jurors had agreed to accept
the quotient and had insisted that the one juror was bound by the
agreement and could not object when he saw the amount of the
quotient. The court held that this showing was insufficient to cause
the court to interrogate each of the jurors as to the alleged agree-
ment."4 The cases show that the federal courts are reluctant to
inquire into conduct in the jury room affecting the verdict.
B. Jurisdiction and Venue
1. Jurisdiction of Court-Diversity of Citizenship.-An unincor-
porated labor union, though it has capacity to sue in its own name,
is not a citizen of the state in which it has its principal place of
112. Capital Airlines, Inc. v. Barger, 341 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
113. McInturff v. State, 338 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. 1960).
114. Wyrosdick v. Southern Ry., 192 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
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business. A United States District Court of Tennessee has no
jurisdiction of an action in which the plaintiff and some members of
the union are citizens of the same state." 5
2. Venue-(a) In Anti-Trust Cases.-Where a foreign corporation
has transacted business in the district where the plaintiff was at the
time of the transaction and still is a resident, and the corporation is
continuing to close up the business done therein, it is subject to
action therein though it is no longer an inhabitant of that district
after having removed its principal place of business to another
district."6
(b) Change of Venue-To What District.-In Ragsdale v. Price,"
7
Judge William E. Miller, applying the doctrine of Hoffman v.
Blaski,"8 held that under United States Code title 28, section 1404 (a)
an action brought in a United States court in Tennessee is not subject
to removal to the Northern District of California when the defendant
was not present in California at the time of action brought though
the plaintiff was a resident of California and the alleged injuries
occurred there.
C. Appeal and Error-Scope of Review
In an action to review a decision of the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare under United States Code
title 42, section 405 (g), the court may not re-examine the action of
the referee except to determine whether there was substantial
evidence to support his findings and whether he correctly applied
the pertinent rule of law." 9 In this connection the case of Philip
Carey Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, noted below, should be consulted.
XVIII. SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS CASES
A. Presumptions-Unexplained Absence for Seven Years
Under the Railroad Retirement Act the retired employee is entitled
to an annuity for life and upon his death a lump sum is payable to
specified survivors. When the employee has disappeared and has not
been heard from thereafter, the presumption is that he was alive for
seven years after his disappearance and died at the end of that
period. Hence the persons entitled to take his personal property
115. Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99 (M.D. Tenn.
1960).
116. R. J. Coulter Funeral Home, Inc. v. National Burial Ins. Co., 192 F.
Supp. 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
117. 185 F. Supp. 263 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
118. 363 U.S. 335, (1960). Comment in 14 VAND. L. RV. 646 (1961).
119. Bowling v. Flemming, 186 F. Supp. 421 (EDl. Tenn. 1960).
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under the statute of distribution are entitled under the Act to the
accumulated annuities and the lump sum payable at his death.120
This decision as to the effect of the presumptions involved is not
supported by most cases. The usual rule is that death is presumed
at the expiration of the seven-year period but the time of the death
is a subject of proof unaided by any presumption.
B. Jurisdiction-Federal Question-28 U.S.C. § 1331
The United States district courts have jurisdiction of an action in
which it appears in the complaint that the validity, construction or
effect of an act of Congress or other applicable federal regulation is
involved. Where the complaint alleges only the refusal of a state
official to apply the act or regulation, there is no jurisdiction even
though the defendant's answer challenges the constitutionality of the
act or regulation.'
2'
C. Venue-Change of Venue-28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
Judge Robert L. Taylor transferred an action brought in the
Eastern District of Tennessee to the Southern District of Mississippi.
It was common ground that the action might have been brought in
Mississippi against the corporate defendant. At the time of the
transfer there were individual defendants who could not have been
served in Mississippi or in the eastern district. These defendants had
been added by an amended complaint some six weeks after the filing
of the original complaint; before making the motion to transfer, the
plaintiff had filed notice of dismissal as to them but there had been
no order of dismissal by the court. In a proceeding for a final writ
of mandamus to require Judge Taylor to vacate the order of transfer
and to prohibit the transfer, brought by the corporate defendants, the
court of appeals held the transfer authorized by United States Code
title 28, section 1404(a). It left undetermined the question whether
the dismissal of the individual defendants was effective without an
order of dismissal by the court, for the reason that the time of
filing the original complaint was decisive. 22
D. Appeal and Error-Grounds of Appeal
1. Insufficiency of Evidence To Support Verdict-(a).-This
ground is unavailable to appellant in the absence of a motion by
appellant at the trial to direct a verdict in his favor. 23
120. Tobin v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 286 F.2d 480 (6th Cir.
1961).
121. Shelby County v. Fairway Homes, Inc., 285 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1961).
122. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 286 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1961).
123. Southern Ry. v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1960).
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(b).-But in a criminal case the court under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 52(b) may notice plain error. Thus where the
offense charged was uttering and publishing as true a forged and
counterfeit writing, the evidence showed without dispute that the
writing was an entirely valid Treasury check with no purported
indorsement of the name of the payee but bearing only a written
signature of another than the payee. The error in receiving a verdict
of guilty was held by the court to be so obviously without support
in the evidence that it should be noticed even though defendant had
not moved for a directed verdict. The court remanded the case with
instructions to enter final judgment of acquittal.124
2. Finding Clearly Erroneous.-The court adopts the test of clear
error as stated by the Supreme Court in McAllister v. United
States.125 "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a 'mistake has been
committed.'" It finds the evidence amply sufficient to support the
findings.
126
3. Error at Trail-Misconduct of Party-Failure To Disclose to
Judge.-The refusal to grant a new trial because of the failure of the
prevailing party to disclose to the judge that a son-in-law of a juror
would be called as a witness for him was not an abuse of discretion
under the circumstances disclosed on the motion for a new trial.
12 7
E. Record on Appeal-Findings of Fact-Necessary Finding
Where the findings of fact omit a finding necessary to enable the
court properly to review the case on appeal, the judgement will be
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings, including
the taking of further evidence if the parties so desire.
128
XIX. SUPREME COURT
It should be noted that Rogers v. United States129 makes it clear
that the question of whether a confession is true or not has no bear-
ing upon the question of its admissibility under the due process
clause, and its consideration in the ruling by a state court on the
admissibility of a coerced confession is prejudicial error.
124. Carr v. United States, 278 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1960).
125. 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954).
126. Local 984, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d
231 (6th Cir. 1961).
127. Southern Ry. v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1960).
128. Atlantic Constr. Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1960).




The following enactments of the Eighty-second General Assembly
contain provisions relating to procedure or evidence and should be
consulted and noted by members of the profession engaged in litiga-
tion.
A. Remedies
1. Certiorari.-In all legislation pertaining to the review of action
by the various agencies, departments and boards, it is important to
examine the pertinent enactment to ascertain whether any remedy
is specified. For example:
(a) .- In Tennessee Code Annotated section 57-209, passed February
22, it is provided that the sole and exclusive remedy for review of
the commissioner's action upon an application for a liquor license or
action in revoking a license is by statutory certiorari in lieu of an
appeal with a trial de novo. This substitutes statutory certiorari for
common law certiorari. The validity of the new provision may de-
pend upon whether the commissioner's function's are administrative
or quasi-judicial. See the decisions holding Tennessee Code Anno-
tated section 65-229 (d) "entirely ineffective" noted above, page 1359.
(b).-Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-3923, passed February
15, makes the action of the commissioner of education reviewable
only by common law certiorari.
2. Injunction- (a).-Tennessee Code Annotated section 53-3609,
passed February 21, provides that the state fire marshal may secure
injunctive relief against engaging in business as a liquified petroleum
gas dealer in violation of the terms of the chapter.
(b).-Chapter 235 temporarily authorizes any aggrieved person to
seek an injunction against any further violation of the provisions
regulating the sale and distribution of frozen desserts.
B. Evidence-Admissibility
1. "Prima facie evidence".-Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-1950, passed February 14, denouncing the use of an expired or
unauthorized credit card, phone number, credit number or other
credit device, provides that presentation of such a card or number
is prima facie evidence that the credit device is false, fictitious or
counterfeit or that its use is unauthorized.
2. Effect.-Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-1405, amending
Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-1405, requires the board of
education to record data relative to tenure including date of employ-
ment, date when tenure attained, leaves of absence, etc. This act
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makes admissable in all administrative and judicial proceedings a
copy of the record certified by the commissioner. This is subject to
challenge only for accuracy and authenticity as reflected by the
records of the local board of education.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 38-702, passed March 1, sets up
a post mortem division of the department of public health and
provides for medical examiners. Tennessee Code Annotated section
38-710 makes the records of the division or transcripts thereof certi-
fied by the chief medical examiner receivable as "competent evidence
in any court of the State of the facts and matters therein contained."
C. Jurisdiction and Venue
1. Jurisdiction Over Person-Service of Process.-Tennessee Code
Annotated section 20-230, passed March 9, makes provision for
service of process on non-residents who operate or maintain water
craft upon the waters of this state similar to that provision which
heretofore provided for service upon non-resident motorists. The
chapter must be carefully examined. Its terms are not identical with
the hit-and- run motorist statute.
2. Venue-In Divorce Action.-Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-804, passed March 8, repeals the provision in Tennessee Code An-
notated section 36-804 which authorized action where defendant was
found. It strikes the words "is found" from the clause "in which the
defendant resides or is found, if a resident."
D. Miscellaneous
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2907, passed February 14,
makes a radical, needed change in the procedure for revoking the
suspension of a suspended sentence for violation of the conditions.
At the earliest practicable moment after arrest, (1) inquiry into the
violation is to be made, (2) the defendant must be present, (3) he
is entitled to be heard and to be represented by counsel, and (4) he
is given the right of appeal to the supreme court as in other criminal
cases.
1. Alternate Jurors.-Tennessee Code Annotated section 22-242,
passed February 21, provides that the present provisions of Tennessee
Code Annotated section 22-222 are to remain effective in counties
having 150,000 or more inhabitants.
2. Qualification of Judges.-Tennessee Code Annotated section
117-119, passed March 15, does away with the sorry spectacle pre-
sented in the contest over the election of Mr. Justice Felts. It requires
members of the supreme court, of the court of appeals, chancery
court, circuit courts and criminal courts to be authorized to practice
law in the courts of Tennessee.
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